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Abstract
This paper provides evidence on the effect of electoral institutions on the performance
of public officials. Using panel data on state supreme courts between 1947 and 1994, we
measure the effects of changes in judicial electoral processes on judge work quality – as
measured by citations by later judges. Judges selected by non-partisan elections write
higher-quality opinions than judges selected by partisan elections. Judges selected
by technocratic merit commissions write higher-quality opinions than either partisan-
elected judges or non-partisan-elected judges. Election-year politics reduces judicial
performance in both partisan and non-partisan election systems. Giving stronger
tenure to non-partisan-selected judges improves performance, while giving stronger
tenure to partisan-selected judges has no effect. These results are consistent with the
view that technocratic merit commissions have better information about the quality
of candidates than voters, and that political bias can reduce the quality of elected
officials.
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1 Introduction
The goal of this paper is to contribute to our understanding of the labor market for elected
officials. As Epstein et al. (2013) observe for federal judges, the decision-making powers of
public officials can have large impacts upon our lives, yet their pecuniary rewards are by
design only weakly related to their performance. In consequence, a variety of concerns –
including career rewards (Ferejohn, 1986; Alesina and Tabellini, 2007; Dewatripont et al.,
1999), professionalism (Wilensky, 1964), and prosociality (Benabou and Tirole, 2006) – can
be decisive in determining the behavior of public officials. These motivations are in large part
intrinsic to the individual, meaning that the performance of public individuals is determined
in part by the type of person who is selected to serve in the public interest.
In this paper we exploit the fact that the method used to select and reappoint judges to
state appellate courts varies over time and across states. In contrast to the U.S. Supreme
Court, where justices have lifetime tenure, most U.S. states use one of three types of regular
review: partisan elections, in which judges are explicitly affiliated with a political party on
the ballot; non-partisan systems, where there is a vote, but party affiliation is not listed; and
finally, a merit system in which judges are nominated by a commission of experts – senior
attorneys and retired judges – and confirmed by the governor.
There is a lively debate regarding which is the superior system. The fact that states have
experimented with different systems illustrates that it is not clear which system is optimal.
There is a body of research that shows that the political affiliation of a judge at the margin
affects the decisions that they make (Huber and Gordon, 2004; Lim, 2013; Canes-Wrone et al.,
2014). Yet regardless of party affiliation, judges are tasked with interpreting and applying
the law as written. In a common law system where judges follow their predecessors, the
quality of a decision can have a large impact on the evolution of legal rules. The goal of this
paper is to assess how variations in the appointment system affects the quality of judicial
decisions.
To address these questions we have created a large panel dataset consisting of 400,000
opinions written by more than 1500 judges for all fifty states for the years 1947 through
1994. With this data we are able to construct a large number of diagnostic performance
measures, for example the number of decisions written, the length of decisions, and how
often those decisions are cited by later judges. To make the results intuitive, we construct
five performance indexes from the individual performance variables. These include Total
Output, Effort Per Case, Discretionary Opinions, Case Quality, and Total Impact. These
indexes provide useful summaries of how judges change their behavior in response to changes
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in electoral procedures.
This data is uniquely suited to study the impact of appointment systems upon the per-
formance of public officials. First, the job of judging has varied little over this time period,
meaning that we can more credibly assign variations in outcomes to variations in the indi-
vidual performance by judges. Second, there is great deal of experimentation over time by
states in the selection and retention processes.
This variation allows us to carry out a set of natural experiments to study how the quality
and performance of judges responds to electoral reforms. First, following the approach in Ash
and MacLeod (2015), we can explore within-judge changes of the electoral cycle. Specifically,
we compare the performance of a judge in a year in which he is up for election with years
in which he is not up for election. We find that in contested systems, election-year politics
takes away time from work. In an election year performance is reduced, in both partisan
and non-partisan elections. In uncontested systems where judges do not have a challenger,
there is no decrease in performance during election years.
In addition to the electoral cycle, we study the within-judge effect of reforming the
retention process. Moving from partisan to non-partisan elections reduces performance, while
moving from non-partisan to uncontested elections increases performance. However, there
is no effect on performance moving from partisan to uncontested elections. We demonstrate
that partisan-selected judges do not change their electoral behavior – even after the reform,
they reduce performance during election years.
A more challenging question is to measure the selection effects of the different electoral
processes. We do this by comparing the performance of judges on the same court, making
decisions in the same year, but selected under different systems. We add a number of controls,
and carry out some robustness checks, and find that compared to judges selected by voters,
there is consistent evidence that judges selected by a merit commission are better at their
jobs.
In a recent paper, Choi et al. (2010) explore a similar set of issues using data from
1998, 1999 and 2000. First, they find that the correlation between appointment systems
and measures of judge effort are quite unstable and sensitive to the control variables that
they use. In their most highly controlled specification, the partisan judges are estimated to
work harder (write more decisions) than judges selected under other systems. The results on
quality are more stable, but tend to be close to zero, with a judge selected under a partisan
system having a slightly negative effect upon quality.
These results are interesting for two reasons. First, they illustrate how the cross-section
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can give a very different picture from estimates that are able to more tightly control for
judge characteristics. Second, as a practical matter, state legislators would not have access
to estimates such as ours, but would have to base their choice of appointment system upon
observations of their current system and how it compares to other states. From our perspec-
tive, if the cross-sectional estimates are unstable, this implies that the choice of appointment
system is more likely to be random, and hence our identification strategy is more likely yield
a measure of the causal effect of the change in appointment system.
To help with the interpretation of our results, we introduce a simple model of the appoint-
ment system based on Condorcet’s (1785) observation that elections are a way of aggregating
information. Specifically, we suppose that the representative voter gets a noisy signal of judge
ability. In such a model a merit plan can be viewed as a system in which the representa-
tive voter (governor) receives a higher-quality signal of performance, and accordingly the
expected ability of the selected judge is higher than under a system that relies upon the
public’s impression of a judge.
Partisan elections can be distinguished from non-partisan elections by supposing that the
representative voter prefers a judge from her preferred political party. This is modeled by
adding a bias b in favor of the voter’s party. As the bias increases, the expected ability falls
and eventually approaches the expected ability that a one-candidate election would produce.
We find that this simple model is broadly consistent with the evidence on state supreme
court judges. This evidence is more broadly consistent with the early rational-choice ap-
proaches of Downs (1957) and Ferejohn (1986), in which voters use their information to
make the best decisions they can, conditional upon their policy preferences. But more infor-
mation is not always better; more information on candidate quality can improve performance
(see Pande, 2011), but more information on political affiliation can reduce performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an institutional back-
ground on state supreme court selection and retention. Section 3 introduces a model of the
selection and incentive effects of judicial elections. Section 4 discusses the issue of measuring
judge performance. Sections 5, 6, and 7 report the results, respectively. Section 8 provides
a concluding discussion.
2 Background
This section provides relevant background for the theoretical and empirical analysis. First,
Subsection 2.1 describes the electoral institutions that provide our treatment variation. Sub-
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Table 1: Judicial Selection and Retention Systems
State (Years) Selection Retention State (Years) Selection Retention
Alaska Merit Uncontested Mississippi Partisan Partisan
Alabama Partisan Partisan Montana Non-Partisan Non-Partisan
Arkansas Partisan Partisan North Carolina Partisan Partisan
Arizona (-1974) Non-Partisan Non-Partisan North Dakota Non-Partisan Non-Partisan
Arizona (1975-) Merit Uncontested Nebraska (-1962) Partisan Partisan
Colorado (-1966) Partisan Partisan Nebraska (1963-) Merit Uncontested
Colorado (1967-) Merit Uncontested New Mexico (-1988) Partisan Partisan
Florida (-1971) Partisan Partisan New Mexico (1989-) Partisan Uncontested
Florida (1972-1976) Non-Partisan Non-Partisan Nevada Non-Partisan Non-Partisan
Florida (1977-) Merit Uncontested New York (1978-) Partisan Partisan
Georgia (-1984) Partisan Partisan Ohio Partisan Non-Partisan
Georgia (1985-) Non-Partisan Non-Partisan Oklahoma (-1967) Partisan Partisan
Iowa (-1962) Partisan Partisan Oklahoma (1968-) Merit Uncontested
Iowa (1963-) Merit Uncontested Oregon Non-Partisan Non-Partisan
Idaho Non-Partisan Non-Partisan Pennsylvania (1969-) Partisan Uncontested
Illinois (-1964) Partisan Partisan South Dakota (-1980) Non-Partisan Non-Partisan
Illinois (1965-) Partisan Uncontested South Dakota (1981-) Merit Uncontested
Indiana (-1970) Partisan Partisan Tennessee (-1971) Partisan Partisan
Indiana (1971-) Merit Uncontested Tennessee (1972-1977) Merit Uncontested
Kansas (-1958) Partisan Partisan Tennessee (1978-) Partisan Partisan
Kansas (1959-) Merit Uncontested Texas Partisan Partisan
Kentucky (-1975) Partisan Partisan Utah (-1951) Partisan Partisan
Kentucky (1976-) Non-Partisan Non-Partisan Utah (1952-1985) Non-Partisan Non-Partisan
Louisiana Partisan Partisan Utah (1986-) Merit Uncontested
Maryland (-1976) Non-Partisan Non-Partisan Washington Non-Partisan Non-Partisan
Maryland (1977-) Merit Uncontested Wisconsin Non-Partisan Non-Partisan
Michigan Partisan Non-Partisan West Virginia Partisan Partisan
Minnesota Non-Partisan Non-Partisan Wyoming (-1972) Non-Partisan Non-Partisan
Missouri Merit Uncontested Wyoming (1973-) Merit Uncontested
Notes. This table lists the elections systems for state supreme court judges observed in our data. Election-
system reforms indicated by cell borders.
section 2.2 provides an overview of our data sources. Subsection 2.3 describes some related
literature.
2.1 Institutions
Our institutional setting is the set of state supreme courts, also known as state courts of
last resort. As described in greater detail in Ash and MacLeod (2015), these courts serve as
the state judiciary’s analogue to the U.S. Supreme Court, where judges review state court
cases rather than federal court cases. In each case, a judge writes an opinion explaining the
decision. The job of a supreme court judge does not change much over the course of the
career, and it does not vary across states.
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While the work tasks are the same, the rules for selecting and retaining appellate judges
vary across states and over time. These rules are listed in Table 1, with rule changes indicated
by cell borders. These changes are used in our empirical section to identify the incentive and
selection effects of changing electoral systems.
We study three major regimes for selecting and retaining appellate judges. There is a
large literature in political science and political economy examining how these systems affect
voter behavior and the politics of judicial decision-making (e.g. Shepherd, 2009; Canes-Wrone
et al., 2010; Lim and Snyder, 2015). There is also a separate legal scholarship discussing the
implications of these systems for legal rulemaking (e.g. Pozen, 2010). For a discussion of the
political motivations behind reforms to these regimes see Hanssen (2004).
The first system, partisan elections, is used for both selection of new judges and retention
of incumbent judges. For these elections, judges are members of a political party, Republican
or Democrat. They must win a primary election for their party before running in a general
election, where their political affiliation is labeled on the ballot.1 Incumbent judges rarely
face a credible challenge in the primary, but in the general election they usually face a
challenger from the opposition political party.
Second, non-partisan elections are also used for both selection and retention. In this
system there are competitive elections, but there are no primaries and party affiliations are
not on the ballot. There are generally two candidates, an incumbent and a challenger, but
the incumbent is not identified as such.
The third major system is merit selection with uncontested retention elections, also known
as the Missouri Plan. In this system, judges are nominated by a commission of experts –
senior attorneys and retired judges – and confirmed by the governor. Incumbent judges
face an up-or-down retention vote with no challenger. This system is designed to be more
meritocratic, and to impose weaker political incentives, than electoral selection. In a fourth
hybrid system, judges are initially selected through partisan elections but thereafter face
uncontested retention elections.
These institutions provide the variation in selection and incentives that we study in the
empirical analysis. In the next section we formally analyze the key differences between these
procedures.
1Ohio and Michigan state judicial elections are difficult to classify within the partisan/non-partisan
dichotomy because they have partisan primaries and nomination processes, but the political party is not on
the ballot in general elections. Following Nelson et al. (2013), we classify these states as partisan elections.
However, coding them as non-partisan, or leaving them out of the analysis, does not change our results.
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2.2 Data Overview
The dataset used for the empirical analysis is an extension of that used in Ash and MacLeod
(2015). It merges information on judge biographies, state-level court institutions, and pub-
lished judicial opinions. These data allow panel estimates on the effects of court institutions
on judge performance.
We have biographical data on almost all the judges working at state supreme courts
between 1900 and today. Table 2 reports summary statistics on the characteristics of judges
working in one of the three selection systems discussed in Section 2.1. For many of the
variables, the systems are comparable. Relative to the partisan judges, the non-partisan
and merit judges are more likely to be female. Merit judges are the most likely to have
judicial experience, while partisan judges are the most likely to have political experience.
Non-partisan and merit judges have longer career lengths. Merit judges are the least likely
to lose re-election.
Our performance measures were constructed from published state supreme court opinions
for the years 1947 through 1994, obtained (along with some annotated metadata) from
bloomberglaw.com. The full sample includes 1,025,461 cases. Because we are interested
in studying the behavior of individual judges, we drop opinions that do not have a named
author (per curiam decisions). We also drop cases that are less than seven sentences in
length – these are summary orders such as cert denials. The restricted sample includes
387,905 majority opinions (plus attached discretionary opinions), about 25 cases per judge
per year on average.
2.3 Literature
As previously mentioned, Choi et al. (2010) find in the cross section that elected judges write
more opinions but merit-selected judges write more highly cited opinions. Other work in this
vein includes Hall and Bonneau (2006), who find that a judge’s qualifications – experience,
salary, and other observable characteristics – increase the chance of being reelected.
Lim and Snyder (2015) provide especially useful evidence in our context. They find
that bar association evaluations of judge candidate quality have a large effect on voting and
electoral success in non-partisan elections, reflecting that voters care about judge quality. In
partisan elections, however, the bar association evaluations have no effect on voter choices
– the information on quality is crowded out by the information on political affiliation. In







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































affect electoral success because virtually all incumbents are retained.
The literature on elections and judge quality is part of a much larger literature examining
the effects of judge elections on the content of judicial rulings. For example, a range of
papers have shown that judges impose harsher criminal sentences in response to stronger
electoral pressure (Huber and Gordon, 2004; Gordon and Huber, 2007; Lim, 2013; Berdejo
and Yuchtman, 2013; Iaryczower et al., 2013; Park, 2014). More generally, previous papers
have demonstrated that the politics of selection matter for the ideology of the selected
judges (Landes and Posner, 2009; Epstein et al., 2013), and that incumbent judges respond
to changes in the political preferences of the body responsible for retaining them (Shepherd,
2009; Canes-Wrone et al., 2010).
More broadly, our results add to the emerging empirical literature in political economy
on how to design the institutions for selecting and rewarding public officials. These papers
include Besley and Case (1995), Besley and Coate (2003), List and Sturm (2006), Besley
et al. (2010), and Ash et al. (2015). Our focus on the information available to voters is
relevant to the literature on transparency, which includes Snyder and Stromberg (2010),
Ferraz and Finan (2011), and Pande (2011).
Deserving special mention are the models in Alesina and Tabellini (2007, 2008), analyzing
the differences in incentives for elected politicians versus tenured bureaucrats. One can view
the variation in the way state judges are (re-)appointed as a natural test bed for these
ideas. Judges selected and retained by partisan or non-partisan elections can be treated
as “politicians,” while judges selected by merit commissions and given strong tenure can
be treated as “bureaucrats.” Our evidence that merit-selected judges produce more highly
cited decisions is consistent with the hypothesis that in the case of appellate court judges,
individuals selected to be good “bureaucrats” perform as well as or better than elected
politicians.
3 Model
In this section we introduce a model based upon Condorcet’s (1785) jury theorem that views
voting as an information revelation problem.2 The model provides a simple framework that
is sufficiently rich to make clear predictions for the cases we consider.3 It is assumed that
each voter has a noisy measure of judge quality that is used to make their decisions. In
2see Young (1988) for a discussion
3See Ashworth and de Mesquita (2008) and Ashworth et al. (2015) for more sophisticated versions of this
class of models.
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addition they care about the political views of judges, which is modeled as a bias in favor of
judges from their preferred party.
More precisely, suppose that there is an opening for a judge from which there are two
candidates, A and B. One of these could be an incumbent, but we abstract from this
and suppose that each judge j has a quality level qj drawn from a normal distribution:
qj ∼ N (0, 1) , j ∈ {A,B}. It is assumed that these draws are uncorrelated, though different
jurisdictions may have different distributions. The socially desirable outcome is to choose
the most able judge, though a judge’s political views may bias this decision.
The remaining subsections analyze how differences in information on judge candidates
may influence the expected quality qj of the judge selected, as well as the judge’s performance
once he is in office. Subsection 3.1 introduces a merit selection baseline where the better
judge is always selected. Subsection 3.2 considers the consequences of electoral selection,
where voters do not have perfect information, and may be biased by politics. Subsection 3.3
looks at the effects on an incumbent judge of electoral campaign demands.
3.1 Merit Selection and Governor Appointment
The salient feature of merit selection is that there is a committee that looks carefully at each
potential candidate. We model this by supposing that qj is observable to members of the
commission. The merit commission is assumed to be able to communicate its finding clearly
to the governor, who in turn will select the more able candidate. Thus, the expected quality
of a judge under an appointment system is the first order statistic:
q¯M = E {max {qA, qB}} = 1√
pi
> 0.
If the expected ability of a randomly chosen candidate is 0, then selecting the better one
from a pool of only two judges results in positive expected quality. Increasing the size of the
pool would simply increase the expected quality of the appointed judge; it is the same logic
as Condorcet’s (1785) jury theorem.
We can compare this to an appointment system where political bias enters. As a matter
of convention we suppose that the governor (and later the representative voter) prefers Judge
A. We can model this as a bias b and suppose that Judge A is chosen if and only if:
qA + b ≥ qB. (3.1)
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Let I (qA,qB, b) = 1 if (3.1) and zero otherwise. Let
q¯G (b) = E {qAI (qA,qB, b) + (1− I (qA,qB, b)) qB} . (3.2)
In the appendix we show:
Proposition 1. The average quality of judges chosen under an unbiased merit panel is
higher than that under governor appointment with bias: q¯M = q¯G (0) > q¯G (b) , b 6= 0. The
difference in quality rises as the level of political bias increases: q¯G (b) is strictly decreasing
in b.
This rather intuitive result illustrates the cost associated with bias. In the absence of
any bias the best candidate is chosen. However, preference for one or the other candidate
can lead to the less able individual being chosen in some cases.
3.2 Selection of Judges by Election
Next we consider the effect on quality of selecting judges by election. This is modeled by
supposing that the quality of information held by the electorate is lower than that of the
merit panel. Suppose that the representative voter gets a signal of judge j′s quality:
sj = qj + j
where j is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2j . The precision is defined by
ρj = 1/σ2j . The representative voter observes the two signals and then assesses the relative
quality of the judges.
We distinguish partisan and non-partisan electoral systems by introducing bias b. As a
matter of convention suppose that judge A comes from the same party as the representative
voter, where b represents the voter’s utility weight on partisan affiliation. In a non-partisan
system b = 0, while a partisan system is characterized by b > 0.
After observing sj, the voter’s posterior distribution on qj is normal with mean
E {qj|sj} = pijsj
and precision 1 + ρj, where pij = ρj1+ρj is the weight assigned to sj.The representative voter
selects Judge A if and only if
piAsA + b ≥ piBsB.
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As the bias in favor of a judge from the same party increases, the probability that Judge A is
selected increases. This can be understood as reducing the competitiveness of the election.
The expected quality of a judge selected under an electoral system with bias b is defined by:
q¯E (b) = E {qAI (piAsA, piBsB, b) + qB (1− I (piAsA, piBsB, b))} . (3.3)
In the appendix we show:
Proposition 2. When voters do not perfectly observe judge quality, the average quality of
elected judges is lower than that of merit-selected judges:
qM ≥ q¯G (b) > q¯E (b) .
Average judge quality falls with the strength of political bias, and therefore quality with par-
tisan elections is lower than that with non-partisan elections: q¯E (b) falls with b.
As in the previous case, bias reduces the effectiveness of the electoral system.
3.3 Campaign Incentives
We now build upon the previous framework to analyze the incentives for a judge seeking re-
election. The most direct way to introduce campaign effort is to suppose that effort enhances
the quality of the signal observed by voters.
We formalize this idea as follows. We suppose that the individuals have a normal level
of effort for their work, given by y¯A and y¯B for the incumbent A and the challenger B,
respectively. In an election year the individuals divert effort to election-year politics. While
B is a challenger and is not sitting on the court, for simplicity we assume he faces the same
decision problem as the incumbent A. This approximates the situation where B is a judge
on another court – a federal court for example, or the state’s intermediate appellate court.
Thus in an election year it is assumed that the individuals supply yA and yB to their
jobs, resulting in election year effort:
eA = y¯A − yA ≥ 0,
eB = y¯B − yB ≥ 0.
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The consequence is that the representative voter chooses judge A over judge B if and only if
piA(sA + eA) + b ≥ piB(sB + eB).
The probability of A winning is:
pA (eA, eB|qA, qB) = E {I (piA(sA + eA), piB(sB + eB), b) |qA, qB} .
Correspondingly, define pB (eA, eB|qA, qB) = 1− pA (eA, eB|qA, qB).
We suppose that candidate j has preferences:
Uj = Bpj (eA, eB|qA, qB)− C (ej) ,
whereB is the intrinsic value from winning the election and Cj(ej) = Cj (y¯j − yj) is the utility
cost of campaign effort. The campaigning cost C (e) is assumed to be twice differentiable in
e and satisfies Cj (0) = C ′j (0) = 0, C ′′j > 0. This guarantees an interior solution.
Let us suppose that A is a sitting judge, while B is a potential challenger. In our data we
can observe the output of judges, and hence both y¯A, the output before an election year, and
yA, the output in an election year, are observable. Consider first an uncontested elections
(the “Missouri Plan”), in which judges do not face a challenger. This can be understood
in the model notation as eB = 0; the challenger sets zero campaign effort. The incumbent
judge A sets eA accordingly.4
Next, we consider the equilibrium when there is an active challenger (details in the
appendix). If we suppose that ρA = ρB, the problem is symmetric and we have eA = eB.
The first-order conditions for effort in this case are given by:












where φ(·) is the standard normal pdf. Since φ (x) achieves its maximum value at x = 0, we
see that effort is highest when:






4The only caveat is for judges who feel they may not get re-elected for whatever reason (for example, bad
press from a high-profile case). Thus, there may be some judges who do exert effort, in which case eA may
be positive. There is never any reason to observe a negative effort level.
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These observations can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 3. When voters have the same quality of information regarding candidates, the
candidates choose the same level of campaign effort. Moreover, the amount of effort is highest
in the most competitive races - when (3.5) is small. In particular, campaign effort decreases
with the bias b. This means that campaigns reduce judging effort more under non-partisan
elections than under partisan elections.
In the appendix we prove that an equilibrium to the campaign effort game exists and
that the effort of Judge A is greater than candidate B if and only if the electorate has a
better measure of Judge A’s quality.
This proposition has the following implications in our data. First, uncontested elections
are the least competitive and have the weakest electoral incentives. Among the electoral
systems, they should have a smaller effect on judging effort than partisan elections or non-
partisan elections. Second, if non-partisan elections have less bias, then they are more
competitive than partisan elections. Therefore non-partisan elections should have a larger
negative effect on judging effort than partisan elections.
4 Measuring Judge Performance
In this section we discuss the problem of measuring judicial performance. We have a large
number of performance variables that could each be used to assess judge performance, making
interpretation of the results difficult. Looking at the separate treatment effects on all of
these outcomes would present a multiple-comparisons problem.5 We resolve this issue by
aggregating the variables into a set of five performance indexes designed to summarize the
effects of the treatments on the work components of judging.
The set of performance variables, along with justifications of how they were divided into
indexes, is discussed in Subsection 4.1. The formal definitions of the indexes are described
in 4.2.
4.1 Performance Variables
The set of performance variables are listed by index in Table 3.6 The table also reports the
mean and standard deviation, where the data are constructed at the judge-year level. The
5We report the effects of treatments on these individual measures in Appendix B.2.
6See Ash and MacLeod (2015) for a detailed discussion of these variables.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics on Judge-Year Performance Variables
Outcome Variable Mean Std. Dev. ML Factor Scores
Case Output Index
Majority Opinions Written 25.25 16.46 0.0564
Total Words in Majority Opinions 55235.35 33630.15 0.64594
Total Sentences in Majority Opinions 2849.436 1937.005 0.21498
Previous Cases Cited in Majority Opinions 510.24 387.92 0.09826
Effort Per Case Index
Words Per Majority Opinion 2453.38 1348.8 0.68332
Sentences Per Majority Opinion 129.8098 98.83284 0.22265
Previous Cases Cited Per Majority Opinion 22.62 16.92 0.11854
Discretionary Opinions Index
Discretionary Opinions Written 6.15 9.1 0.20884
Total Words in Discretionary Opinions 8034.01 15360.4 0.35855
Previous Cases Cited in Discretionary Opinions 86.17 179.71 0.45563
Case Quality Index
Positive Cites Per Opinion 13.03 12.86 0.27311
Distinguishing Cites Per Opinion 2.14 2.74 0.07903
Discuss Cites Per Opinion 2.96 2.75 0.29684
Quoted Cites Per Opinion 3.3 4.22 0.35495
Out-of-State Cites Per Opinion 1.81 2.45 0.06997
Total Impact Index
Total Positive Cites 291.31 275.64 0.2971
Total Distinguishing Cites 44.92 55.54 0.04631
Total Discuss Cites 65.35 54.15 0.35981
Total Quoted Cites 70.12 72.73 0.26187
Total Out-of-State Cites 43.1 79.49 0.06529
Notes. Observation is a judge-year, N=16,084. These statistics are constructed from each judge's yearly 
output of cases.  “Per Opinion” measures are divided by the number of majority opinions written that 
year. See variable definitions in the accompanying text.
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right-most column (ML Factor Scores) will be discussed further in Subsection 4.2. Before
indexes are constructed, all the metrics are transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine.7
The first set of variables constitute a Case Output Index. At the state supreme court
level, if judges accept more cases for review they are taking on more work. An additional
measure of total work is the total number of words written, and total number of sentences
written, in majority opinions. Similarly, the total amount of caselaw research performed –
as measured by the number of previous cases cited a in a judge’s opinions – is included.
The second index is Effort Per Case. This includes two basic opinion length measures –
the average number of words, and average number of sentences, per majority opinion. We
also have a measure of the amount of research a judge engages in – the Previous Cases Cited
measure gives the number of previous authorities cited in her opinions. We include both
the number of sentences and the number of words partly because it is unclear a priori which
is a better measure of language output. It also solves the problem that three measures are
needed to construct ML Factors, as described in Subsection 4.2.
The third index, Discretionary Opinions, includes variables related to effort on discre-
tionary opinions. Whether to write a discretionary opinion—a concurrence or a dissent—is
up to the judge’s discretion and involves willingly taking on more work. Further, the number
of words and number of previous cases cited in those opinions are components of the time
spent on discretionary opinions. In previous versions of the paper, discretionary opinions
were merged in with majority opinions, but the covariance matrix for performance suggests
that they are separate factors in judicial decision making.
Fourth, we look at the Case Quality Index. To measure the quality of decision-making, we
use the number of citations to a judge’s opinions by other judges. In our data, Bloomberg Law
staff attorneys have categorized citations as positive, distinguishing, or negative. A positive
cite is a clear signal that a decision is found useful by a future judge. A distinguishing
cite means that part of the ruling is useful, but needs to be clarified – so this is perhaps
a weaker signal of opinion quality. In the set of positive citations, we also use information
about whether a case is discussed by the future court (rather than cited without comment)
and whether it is directly quoted by the citing court. These measures can be understood
as more direct signals that the citing court finds the opinion useful. The Out-of-State Cites
measure includes positive cites from out-of-state courts; as noted by Choi et al. (2010) among
others, this is perhaps the best measure because the cited case serves as persuasive rather
7Defined as sinh−1(x) = log(x+
√
1 + x2), and used instead of the log transformation to allow for zeros
in the data (Burbidge et al., 1988). Our results are robust to using levels or logs of the dependent variable.
The adjusted R2 is usually higher in the IHS or log specification than in levels.
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than binding precedent. Note that, while these citations provide a good signal of expert
evaluation, they may or may not reflect voter evaluation or what decision is best for social
welfare.
Fifth and finally, the Total Impact Index is a combined quality and quantity measure.
It gives the total number of positive, distinguishing, discussion, quoted-in, and out-of-state
cites to a judge’s work in a year. This serves to complement Case Output as a measure of
quantity, and Case Quality as a measure of quality.
In the results sections, the main text reports the effects of our treatments on the per-
formance indexes. In the appendix we report the effects on the individual variables listed,
as well as a larger set of performance variables not listed here. We break out the effects
on concurrences and dissents, for example, and show negative cites and number of cases
overruled. See Appendix B.2 for details.
4.2 Performance Indexes
We implemented two methods for constructing performance indexes. These include the Z-
score Index and the Maximum Likelihood Factor. Both of these indexes are used in the
regressions reported in the results sections.
First, the Z-score Index refers to the standard aggregation method used in O’Brien (1984),
Kling et al. (2007), and Deming (2009). For this index, each of the performance variables
is residualized on a state and year fixed effect. Then these residuals are standardized by
dividing by the standard deviation. The index is constructed from the average of these
standardized variables for each judge-year observation.
The second index, Maximum Likelihood Factor, uses factor analysis and is based on Rao
(1955) and Akaike (1987). Defining this measure provides an intuitive way of understanding
judge quality and its impact on observed output.
Let k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} index the set of factors underlying judge performance. In our case
those include case quality, effort per case, etc. Let i ∈ {1, 2, ...,mk} index the observed
measures of factor k, for example the four variables representing Case Output in Table 3.
Let zkijt represent the observed level of performance measure i in factor k of judge j in year
t, after being residualized and standardized as done for the Z-score Index. Therefore each
performance measure has zero mean and variance 1. This is natural, as we do not have an
absolute scale for judge performance and are interested in changes rather than levels.
In our model we suppose that rather than choosing the individual measure zkijt, the judge
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chooses the factor, ykjt. The factor ykjt is related to measure zkijt by:
zkijt = αki × ykjt + kijt.
Given that zkijt is standardized for all i and k, factor analysis begins by supposing that ykjt is
normally distributed with mean zero and unit variance over the whole population.
Now we apply the results from Rao (1955). If the number of indexes is greater than or
equal to three (mk ≥ 3), then we can estimate αki , the loading for measure zkijt on factor ykjt,
as follows. Given that the variances are all normalized to be 1, then αki ∈ (−1, 1). However,
if our interpretation is correct, then each component is positively correlated with zijt, hence
we should find αki ≥ 0. This is indeed the case, providing further evidence in support of our
interpretation.
In general, factor analysis allows for several unobserved factors per group of observed
measures. But in our case the natural focus is a single factor model, where all of the
measures in a group are driven by a single factor. We found that a full set of 20 performance
measures is well-explained by a five-factor model, using the standard information criterion.
This is consistent with our interpretation of one factor per group, and allows a more natural
interpretation for each factor.

















for the full sample, denoted by Σx. By construction the diagonal
elements will be 1/α2ik > 1. Next let ~ykjt be a vector of scalars, all equaling ykjt, with length
mk (the number of performance measures in group k). The covariance of ~ykjt is JJT , where
JT is a vector of ones with length mk and JJT is an mk ×mk matrix of ones. Finally, let
Σ = Σx − JJT





Next we form the predicted factor ~ykjt. Since xkijt is an unbiased estimate of the factor
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Table 4: Summary Correlations on Performance Indexes
Population Correlations
Case Output Case Effort Discretionaries Case Quality Total Impact
Z-score Indexes
Case Output 1
Case Effort 0.2525 1
Discretionaries 0.3574 0.1498 1
Case Quality 0.1595 0.5635 0.0815 1
Total Impact 0.8078 0.2154 0.2828 0.5664 1
Maximum Likelihood Factors
Case Output 1
Case Effort 0.3402 1
Discretionaries 0.3406 0.1224 1
Case Quality 0.2044 0.5448 0.0893 1
Total Impact 0.8027 0.187 0.2786 0.5535 1
Mean Within-Judge Correlations
Case Output Case Effort Discretionaries Case Quality Total Impact
Z-score Indexes
Case Output 1
Case Effort 0.2684 1
Discretionaries 0.3397 0.1423 1
Case Quality 0.1906 0.4652 0.0694 1
Total Impact 0.7818 0.2194 0.2689 0.6088 1
Maximum Likelihood Factors
Case Output 1
Case Effort 0.3424 1
Discretionaries 0.3196 0.1091 1
Case Quality 0.2088 0.4390 0.0706 1
Total Impact 0.7877 0.1944 0.2675 0.5805 1









We repeat this process for each of the five groups of measures to produce the five ML
Factor indexes used in the regression analysis. The estimated weight αki for each measure
is given in the right-most column of Table 3. By construction, the mean of yˆkjt is zero.
The correlation matrices for each factor ykjt with all the other factors are given in Table
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4. The table reports the population correlations as well as the means of the within-judge
correlations. Judges who work hard overall, will also work hard per case, and thus we observe
correlation between factors.
5 Effect of Being Up For Election
This section examines how judges change their behavior over time in response to the election
cycle. Ash and MacLeod (2015) show that contested elections reduce performance. We add
to that analysis by distinguishing between partisan and non-partisan elections. In theory, if
judges wish to be re-elected then they should put effort into election year politics, as implied
by the theory. This in turn leads to a reduction in output on the court. The question is
whether the way a judge is elected affects this effort?
5.1 Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy for examining the effects of electoral demands on judicial behavior is
to exploit the staggered election cycle for identification of stronger electoral incentives. The
election schedule is arbitrarily assigned by history, so it is reasonable to assume that the
schedule is uncorrelated with other institutional or socioeconomic factors that might affect
individual judge performance. For this analysis we used data provide by Kritzer (2011).
The electoral cycle is represented in our regressions as a vector of dummy variables Eist,
which equals one for years that a judge is up for election. There is a different element of the
vector for partisan, non-partisan, and uncontested retention elections. The dummy variable
is coded as a one regardless of whether the judge actually ran for election – this is needed
to avoid endogeneity problems from the judge’s choice whether to actually run.
One possible source of bias in this analysis comes from time-invariant characteristics of
individual judges. Some judges may have higher or lower performance than others on average
due to unobservable characteristics, and they may be up for election more often or less often
for any number of reasons. To deal with this possibility, we include a full set of judge-specific
fixed effects. Therefore any estimated election coefficients are relative to a judge’s personal
average.
A second major source of bias comes from the time-varying changes in the court work
environment which may be correlated with the electoral schedule. For example, there may be
campaigning demands during election years on all judges – not just those up for election – if
they are asked to assist fellow members of their political party. To deal with this possibility,
20
we include a full set of state-year fixed effects. Therefore any estimated election coefficients
are also relative to the court average in each year. This means they effectively compare
judges sitting on the same court, working at the same time, but who are in different stages
of the electoral cycle.
Formally, we estimate
yist = JUDGEi + STATEs × YEARt + E ′istρ+ ist (5.1)
where JUDGEi is a judge fixed effect, STATEs × TIMEt is a state-year fixed effect for each
s and year t, and Eist includes the election-year treatments. Standard errors are clustered
by state.
5.2 Results
The coefficient estimates from Equation (5.1) are reported in Table 5. Each row is from a
separate regression, where the three columns report the estimate for partisan, non-partisan,
and uncontested elections, respectively. These coefficients can be interpreted as the standard-
deviation change in a judge’s performance when he is up for election relative to his own
average and the state-year average of his colleagues.
Columns 1 and 2 show the effects of being up for elections under contested elections.
Under partisan elections, there is a decrease in performance across the board. Under non-
partisan elections, there is a decrease in discretionary opinions and on total impact.
Column 3 gives the effect of elections for uncontested systems. The effects are the oppo-
site. Instead of a negative effect, there is a positive change in total output, effort per case,
discretionary opinions, and total impact.
5.3 Discussion
The fact that the point estimates in the partisan and non-partisan elections are negative
and have the same order of magnitude, while the estimated effects for uncontested elections
is, if anything positive, is consistent with the expectation that election year politics take
time. The results are generally supportive of the idea that judges reduce judging effort
during election years to spend more time on campaigning. The least competitive election
system, uncontested elections, has the smallest effect on behavior as we would expect given
Proposition 3. There may actually be some positive effects, which might be consistent with
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Table 5: Effect of Being Up For Election
Partisan Election Year
Outcome (1) (2) (3)
Case Output
Z-index -0.106* -0.154 0.119+
(0.0473) (0.0959) (0.0609)
ML Factor -0.113* -0.164 0.126+
(0.0493) (0.100) (0.0643)
Effort Per Case
Z-index -0.0543+ -0.0253 0.0576*
(0.0281) (0.0281) (0.0290)
ML Factor -0.0558+ -0.0361 0.0582+
(0.0286) (0.0298) (0.0318)
Discretionary Opinions
Z-index -0.0640+ -0.0625** 0.0703+
(0.0340) (0.0231) (0.0387)
ML Factor -0.0627+ -0.0633** 0.0699+
(0.0369) (0.0233) (0.0406)
Case Quality
Z-index -0.0643+ -0.0415 0.0252
(0.0366) (0.0381) (0.0418)
ML Factor -0.0701+ -0.0532 0.0155
(0.0383) (0.0383) (0.0408)
Total Impact
Z-index -0.109* -0.165* 0.0840+
(0.0462) (0.0821) (0.0479)
ML Factor -0.112* -0.182* 0.0856+
(0.0487) (0.0882) (0.0492)
Treated States 23 17 19
Treated Judges 437 270 277





N= 16,084 judge-years. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
Each row is from a separate regression for the stated outcome variable. Treatment variable is a dummy 
equaling one for years judge is facing reelection. Regressions include a state-year fixed effect and judge 
fixed effect, estimated using Stat's reg2hdfe module.
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a desire to do a better job in an election year, though this would only be speculation.8
In contrast, there are negative effects on judging effort in the contested systems, where
judges spend time campaigning during election years. The results for the non-partisan
elections are consistent with the idea from Lim and Snyder (2015) that they are competitive
and require campaign work. What is possibly more surprising is the large negative effect in
the case of partisan elections. This is surprising because we would expect that given voters
tend to follow party lines, then one would not expect these elections to be as competitive
as the non-partisan elections. It would be interesting to know what role elections play in
campaign financing, and if there are spillover effects between judicial campaigns and other
campaigns that are occurring at the same time.
6 Effect of the Selection Process on Judge Quality
In this section we investigate how changes to the procedure to select judges affects the quality
of chosen judges. This analysis is motivated by Proposition 2. Selection mechanisms that
use better information about candidates or have less bias should, all else equal, select better
candidates on average.
A priori, there is no reason to suppose that a judge chosen by the Missouri Plan faces less
bias than in, say, a non-partisan election. However, the intent of using a merit commission
is to create a pool of better qualified judges. Similarly, political parties have an incentive to
choose qualified judges that are consistent with the party’s views. Hence, it is an empirical
question whether or not the judges chosen by the Missouri Plan or by a partisan election
system are of higher or lower quality that those selected under a non-partisan system. What
the theory illustrates is that the presence of bias reduces quality, while more precise signals
increase quality.
6.1 Empirical Strategy
This subsection describes the empirical strategy for measuring the effects on judge quality of
different judge selection systems. The source of identification used is the set of reforms to the
judicial selection systems, depicted in Table 1. Three states changed from partisan selection
8Note that since the mid-1990s, third-party funding for negative advertising in Missouri Plan elections
has increased significantly. Our results may not extend to more recent years (our panel ends in 1994). This
is an important area for future research.
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to non-partisan selection: Georgia, Kentucky, and Utah.9 Six states moved from partisan
selection to merit selection: Colorado, Iowa, Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska, and Oklahoma.10
Three states moved from non-partisan selection to merit selection: Arizona, Maryland, and
South Dakota.11 The goal of the empirics is to compare the performance of judges selected
before these reforms to the performance of judges selected after these reforms.
We control for time-varying state-specific factors by including a full set of state-year
(interacted) fixed effects. This specification effectively compares the performance of judges
sitting on the same court at the same time, but selected under different regimes. We carry
out some robustness check to ensure that timing issues, such as the age of the judge, do
not explain our results. We do this by including a full set of dummies for years of judge
experience. This means that any estimates are made relative to other judges of the same
experience level.
Second, the regressions include a full set of dummies for the judge’s starting year. This
set of controls complements the years of experience, with the goal of controlling for cohort-
specific effects on performance. For example, judges beginning in the 1970s may be system-
atically better than judges beginning in the 1980s, due to changes in the economy. These
indicators control for national variation in the market for judges as a function of time.
Third, the treatment indicators are active only for years where there are at least two
judges selected from each system working on the court during that year. This is done to
make a clean comparison that is not biased by outlier pre-reform judges who remain on the
bench long after the other pre-reform judges. Appendix Table B8 reports the results when
all years are included – they are similar.
The estimating equation for performance variable yist for judge i in state s at year t is
yist = STATEs × YEARt +X ′istβ + S ′istρ+ ist (6.1)
where STATEs×YEARt includes the state-year fixed effects, Xist includes the indicators for
9Florida also moved from partisan to non-partisan, but it is not included in this section because it changed
to merit selection five years later.
10Tennessee moved to merit selection in 1972, but moved back to partisan selection in 1978. It is not
included in this analysis.
11Florida also moved from non-partisan to merit, but it is not included in this section because it had
changed from partisan to non-partisan elections five years prior. Utah also moved from non-partisan to
merit, but our data set does not extend long enough to get observations with two merit-selected judges.
Wyoming also moved from non-partisan to merit, but there were not any years where there were more than
two judges selected from each system. Wyoming is therefore included in Table B8, where there are similar
results.
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years of judge experience and judge’s starting year, and Sist includes the treatment indicators
equaling one for judges selected under the post-reform system. Standard errors are clustered
by state.
Given the inclusion of the fixed effects, the coefficients ρ procure the average difference
in performance between judges selected under the new system and judges selected under the
old system, controlling for other time-varying state-level factors, for years of experience, and
for cohort effects.12
6.2 Results
Table 6 reports the estimates from Equation (6.1). Column 1 compares non-partisan-selected
judges to partisan-selected colleagues. Column 2 compares merit-selected judges to partisan-
selected judges. Column 3 compares merit-selected judges to non-partisan-selected judges.
The results can be summarized as follows. Non-partisan-selected judges have lower effort-
per-case but higher total impact than partisan-selected judges on average. Merit-selected
judges have higher effort-per-case and higher case quality than partisan-selected judges.
Merit-selected judges have higher discretionary effort and case quality than non-partisan-
selected judges.
6.3 Discussion
First, non-partisan judges have higher total impact than partisan judges. Lim and Snyder
(2015) find that party affiliation drives voter behavior, and hence our result is consistent
with bias, where having a public political affiliation results in worse candidates. The results
on merit selection suggest that merit commissions select better judges than elections. This
is consistent with the model’s notion that merit commissions have more information about
judge quality than voters.
It is worth pointing out that Choi et al. (2010), using 3 years of data and identifying
the effect from a cross section of judges, find a much larger effect of election system upon
output (measured by number of opinions).13 The difference in results illustrates the effect
12Note that in the electoral selection systems, the judges may be initially appointed by the governor to
fill a vacant seat, rather than being initially selected through a competitive electoral process. We still code
the appointed judges as being selected under the electoral system – since the predecessor’s choice whether
to step down is endogenous to the system.
13Rather then estimate the causal effect by comparing the judges on the same court, they run a single model
with a large set of controls. The results are reported in Table 6; in Model 1, the three coefficients for partisan,
non-partisan, and merit selection are: 1.219** (4.930), 0.738** (3.180), 0.651* (2.240) (standard errors in
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Table 6: Effect of Judicial Selection System on Judge Quality
Outcome (1) (2) (3)
Case Output
Z-index -0.0041 -0.084 -0.0261
(0.0914) (0.0750) (0.169)
ML Factor -0.0428 -0.0734 0.00604
(0.105) (0.0743) (0.192)
Effort Per Case
Z-index -0.280* 0.289* 0.305
(0.108) (0.141) (0.213)
ML Factor -0.317* 0.270+ 0.32
(0.125) (0.155) (0.209)
Discretionary Opinions
Z-index 0.341 -0.00129 0.428+
(0.249) (0.150) (0.246)
ML Factor 0.357 0.0262 0.434
(0.224) (0.159) (0.261)
Case Quality
Z-index 0.046 0.194* 0.405+
(0.0919) (0.0767) (0.206)
ML Factor 0.0221 0.194* 0.422*
(0.106) (0.0829) (0.191)
Total Impact
Z-index 0.141+ -0.0349 0.0774
(0.0798) (0.0802) (0.196)
ML Factor 0.115 -0.0614 0.0619
(0.0844) (0.0799) (0.191)
Treated States 3 6 3
Treated State-Years 24 86 24
Treated Judges 14 54 16
Non-Partisan Judges 
Relative to Partisan 
Judges
Merit-Selected Judges 
Relative to Partisan 
Judges
Merit-Selected Judges 
Relative to Non-Partisan 
Judges
N= 16,084 judge-years..Estimate of the average difference between judges selected under a new system, relative 
to to judges selected under the old system, limited to years in which there are at least two judges on the court 
selected from each system. Regressions include a state-year fixed effect, a full set of dummies for years of 
experience, and a full set of dummies for starting years. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. + p < .
1, * p < .05, ** p < .01.
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of research design upon the estimated effects. Given all our controls, one might argue that
our results are a lower bound on the effect of the selection system.
It is worth highlighting the fact that when jurisdictions choose a particular election
system they must rely upon rather crude information regarding the causal effect of a reform.
In particular, the Choi et al. (2010) show that comparing the experience of two jurisdictions
with different systems can easily lead to larger perceived effects of the selection system.
Choi et al. (2010) suggest that out-of-state citations provide the best measure of quality.
They find that merit commissions have zero effect. Since they run a single regression they are
only measuring the correlation between a merit plan and cites. Our identification strategy
attempts to measure the effect of changing from a partisan to merit commission. Here we
find large significant effects on out-of-state citations (see Appendix B.2), consistent with
the hypothesis that merit commissions have access to better information regarding judicial
performance.
7 Variation in Response to Incentives
This section examines differences in the response to incentive changes based on how the
judge was selected.
7.1 Effect of Judge Retention Process
This subsection reports the results on how changing the system for judge retention affects
the performance of sitting judges. Subsection 3.3 discusses the model mechanism for the
effects of retention elections on incumbent judge behavior. More competitive elections result
in more campaigning, which will reduce effort spent on judging. We examine this issue using
judge fixed effects and institutional reforms to the retention system.
7.1.1 Empirical Strategy
Identification comes from discrete changes in the rules for retaining state supreme court
judges. The timing of these reforms is illustrated in Appendix Figure 1. Four states changed
from partisan retention elections to non-partisan retention elections: Florida, Georgia, Ken-
tucky, and Utah. Eight states moved from partisan retention to uncontested retention elec-
parentheses). Given that we have a much longer time period, and more tightly controlled comparisons, the
fact that these coefficients are so large and so significant suggests that the results are driven by variation
across states rather than the variation in electoral system.
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tions: Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, and Oklahoma.
Six states moved from non-partisan retention to uncontested retention: Arizona, Florida,
Maryland, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming.14
The regression framework is a standard differences-in-differences approach based on
Bertrand et al. (2004). To control for time-invariant judge characteristics that may be
correlated with the retention system in various states, we include judge fixed effects. To
control for national trends in performance, we include year fixed effects. To control for pre-
existing state trends in performance that may be confounded with the reforms, we include
state-specific linear trends.
As in Ash and MacLeod (2015), we measure effects in a ten-year window around the
reforms. The regressions include an indicator equaling one for the baseline time window
of ten years before and ten years after a change to the retention system. The treatment
variable is a dummy for the ten years after the change. Thus, with the inclusion of the
judge fixed effects, the estimates can be interpreted as the average difference in within-judge
performance for the ten years after the policy change relative to the ten years before the
policy change. In a handful of states, we shrank the time window if the reform occurred
close to the beginning or end of the sample.15
Formally, we estimate
yist = YEARt + JUDGEi + STATEs × t+ R¯′stρ¯+R′stρ+ ist (7.1)
where YEARt is a fixed effect for year t, JUDGEi is a judge fixed effect, and STATEs × t is
a state-level linear time trend for state s. The term R¯st is a vector of indicators equaling one
for the baseline time windows of ten years before and ten years after each of the retention
reforms. Rst is a vector of treatment indicators for the ten years after each rule change.
Standard errors are clustered by state.
With the inclusion of the judge fixed effects, the estimates for the elements of ρ can be
interpreted as the average difference in within-judge performance for the ten years after the
policy change relative to the ten years before the policy change. Notice that these results
14For some of these treatments, there were other types of judicial reforms occurring around the same time.
See Appendix B.1 for more details and robustness checks.
15These reforms are mostly enacted by voters through ballot referendums administered in November and
officially going into effect the subsequent January. In these cases the dummy variable would turn on in the
year following the vote. In cases where the policy is effective in the first half of the year, it is coded as
turning on in that year. Note that Florida changes from partisan to non-partisan and then to uncontested
elections. In the table regressions it is coded using the years depicted in the figure. Our results do not
change substantially if Florida is left out of the analysis.
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apply to different types of judges. For example, moving from a partisan to non-partisan
system measures the effect of the change upon a judge selected under a partisan system.
7.1.2 Results
Table 6 reports our estimates for ~ρ from Equation 6.2. Each row is from a separate regression,
with the first column giving the partisan-to-nonpartisan effect, the second column giving the
partisan-to-uncontested effect, the the third column giving the nonpartisan-to-uncontested
effect. Each regression includes a year fixed effect, judge fixed effect, and state trend.
Column 1 gives the incentive effect on sitting judges of moving from a partisan system
to a non-partisan system. There is a negative effect on case output. Column 2 has the
effect of moving from a partisan system to an uncontested system. Here we see no effects on
performance. In Column 3, we see that a move from non-partisan to uncontested elections
is associated with an increase in discretionary effort and on case quality.
7.1.3 Discussion
Begin with the move from partisan to non-partisan. There is a decrease in case output.
Without placing too much emphasis on these estimates (and noting the small sample of states
for this reform), this is consistent with the point in the model that nonpartisan elections are
more competitive than partisan elections, and therefore impose greater electoral constraints
on a judge’s time.
What about the effect of moving from partisan to uncontested? There are no effects.
This could mean two things. This would be consistent with the idea from the model and
Lim and Snyder (2015) that partisan systems impose weak electoral incentives, so moving
to an uncontested system wouldn’t change incentives very much. This could also mean that
partisan systems select for judges that don’t care about quality judging, so reducing electoral
incentives does not result in increased judging effort.
We see a positive effect on work quality when moving from non-partisan retention to
uncontested retention. There is a statistically significant increase in discretionary effort and
case quality. In response to the weaker electoral incentives, the non-partisan judges improve
performance. This suggests that the strong electoral demands were taking time away from
judging.
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Table 7: Effect of Changing the Retention System on Incumbent Judge Performance
Outcome (1) (2) (3)
Case Output
Z-index -0.183* 0.0445 -0.0257
(0.0862) (0.0567) (0.103)
ML Factor -0.167+ 0.0355 -0.0324
(0.0849) (0.0568) (0.100)
Effort Per Case
Z-index 0.0748 -0.0931 0.225
(0.196) (0.118) (0.166)
ML Factor 0.0969 -0.0953 0.181
(0.216) (0.108) (0.182)
Discretionary Opinions
Z-index -0.00425 -0.0132 0.216+
(0.0652) (0.136) (0.115)
ML Factor 0.0169 -0.018 0.226+
(0.0644) (0.143) (0.127)
Case Quality
Z-index 0.0352 -0.0716 0.283*
(0.133) (0.104) (0.111)
ML Factor 0.039 -0.0722 0.262*
(0.166) (0.120) (0.115)
Total Impact
Z-index -0.142 0.0313 0.0595
(0.0918) (0.0813) (0.122)
ML Factor -0.154 0.0498 0.016
(0.101) (0.0929) (0.140)
Treated States 4 8 6
Treated Judges 25 65 35
Partisan Retention to 
Non-Partisan Retention
Partisan Retention to 
Uncontested Retention
Non-Partisan Retention to 
Uncontested Retention
N= 16,084 judge-years.Estimate of the average treatment effect of changing the judge retention system on 
incumbent judges at the time of the reform. Regressions include a judge fixed effect, year fixed effect, and state 
trends. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01.
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7.2 Relative Election-Year Effect on Judges Selected by Different
Processes
Finally we look at whether judges selected under different systems respond differently to
electoral demands. As in Section 6, we focus on the states that changed their procedures
for selecting judges. We then look at the effect of the electoral cycle separately for judges
selected under different systems.
7.2.1 Empirical Strategy
Again we have the vector of electoral dummies Eist to equal one for judges that are up for
election in year t. In addition, we have the vector of dummies Si for the process under which
a judge is selected. We estimate
yist = JUDGEi + STATEs × YEARt + E ′istρ+ SiE ′istη + ist (7.2)
where we have included a judge and state-year fixed effect as in Section _. While Si isn’t
identified at the judge level, the interactions with the electoral cycle are identified within
and across judges.
We are interested in the following estimates. First, ρ will give the baseline electoral-
cycle effects for non-partisan judges (in the states that went from partisan to non-partisan
elections). It will also give the baseline electoral-cycle effect for merit judges (in the states
that moved from elections to merit selection). The vector of coefficients η will include the
effect of non-partisan elections on partisan-selected judges relative to their non-partisan-
selected counter-parts. It will also include the effect of uncontested elections on partisan-
selected judges relative to their merit-selected counter-parts. Finally, it will include the
effect of uncontested elections on non-partisan-selected judges relative to their merit-selected
counter-parts.
7.2.2 Results
Table 8 reports the relative effects of the electoral cycle by the process a judge is selected.
Column 1a gives the baseline effect of non-partisan elections on non-partisan selected
judges. Column 1a has negative effects on discretionary opinions and total impact, similar
to the baseline election-cycle results. Column 1b shows the relative effect of non-partisan
elections on partisan judges. These are zeros.
31
Table 8: Relative Election-Year Effect On Judges Selected by Different Processes
Outcome (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Case Output
Z-index -0.157 0.136 0.158* -0.198* 0.0663
(0.0982) (0.178) (0.0642) (0.0984) (0.150)
ML Factor -0.168 0.131 0.170* -0.217* 0.0469
(0.103) (0.188) (0.0678) (0.0994) (0.162)
Effort Per Case
Z-index -0.025 -0.0133 0.0836* -0.128* 0.0336
(0.0272) (0.204) (0.0358) (0.0551) (0.111)
ML Factor -0.0356 -0.0178 0.0893* -0.139* -0.0118
(0.0291) (0.189) (0.0377) (0.0559) (0.123)
Discretionary Opinions
Z-index -0.0616* -0.0363 0.0694 0.00347 0.00336
(0.0239) (0.103) (0.0501) (0.0637) (0.117)
ML Factor -0.0622* -0.0429 0.0737 -0.0117 -0.0197
(0.0241) (0.0801) (0.0513) (0.0687) (0.128)
Case Quality
Z-index -0.0486 0.279 0.0626 -0.145 -0.0964
(0.0368) (0.277) (0.0384) (0.128) (0.135)
ML Factor -0.0593 0.239 0.0566 -0.159 -0.111
(0.0370) (0.329) (0.0404) (0.134) (0.119)
Total Impact
Z-index -0.173* 0.302 0.129* -0.198* -0.0234
(0.0837) (0.234) (0.0509) (0.0783) (0.0987)
ML Factor -0.189* 0.261 0.132* -0.206** -0.0226
(0.0902) (0.255) (0.0538) (0.0770) (0.104)
Treated States 2 2 11 8 4
Treated Judges 7 4 119 51 10
Election Events 8 5 201 90 16
Effect of Non-Partisan 
Elections on Non-Parti-
san-Selected Judges
Relative Effect of Non-
Partisan Elections on Par-
tisan-Selected Judges
Effect of Uncontested 
Elections on Merit-Se-
lected Judges
Relative Effect of Uncon-
tested Elections on Parti-
san-Selected Judges
Relative Effect of Uncon-
tested Elections on Non-
Partisan-Selected Judges
N= 16,084 judge-years. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01. Each row is from a separate regression for the 
stated outcome variable. The estimated coefficient is a dummy equaling one for years judge is facing reelection, interacted with a dummy for if the judge is 
selected under the new selection system. Regressions include a state-year fixed effect, judge fixed effect, and the baseline coefficient for the election-year 
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Column 2a gives the baseline effect of uncontested elections on merit-selected judges. As
with the baseline results, there are actually positive effects estimated for the election-cycle
effect in an uncontested system. When one only looks at the merit-selected judges, the effect
is stronger. Column 2b gives the relative effect of uncontested elections on partisan-selected
judges. There are significant negative effects. The coefficients are larger in absolute value
than the coefficients from Column 2a, meaning that uncontested elections actually have a
negative effect on performance for partisan-selected judges. Finally Column 2c gives the
relative effect of uncontested elections for non-partisan-selected judges, relative to merit
judges. There aren’t any significant differences here.
7.2.3 Discussion
The interesting effect in this section is that after changing to uncontested retention elections,
partisan-selected judges still demonstrate the same election-year behavior as they did under
partisan elections. This perhaps explains why there was no within-judge effect of moving
from partisan to uncontested elections – these judges are responding the same way to the
electoral cycle as they had been doing before the reform. This adds further evidence of a
difference in preferences between partisan and non-partisan systems. Partisan judges prefer
to reduce performance in election years, even when those are uncontested elections where
most everyone is retained. One possible interpretation is that because they have more
partisan preferences, they feel a desire to be involved in campaigning for other non-judge
candidates when they are up for election.
8 Conclusion
The goal of this paper has been to evaluate the effect of election processes on the quality of
individuals and the effort they put into their jobs. To address this question we exploit the
fact that the work of judging has remained relatively stable over time, which allows us to
build performance measures based on a database of written state appellate court decisions.
We exploit the fact that U.S. states have experimented with different methods to appoint
judges. This allows us to measure the causal effect of a change in the system upon perfor-
mance. We can also evaluate the selection effect by comparing the performance of judges
selected by different systems, but serving at the same time. Our results are summarized in
Table 9.
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Table 9: Summary of Results
Partisan Judges Non-Partisan Judges Merit Judges
Selection Process Effects
Relative to Partisan Judges ↑ ↑
Relative to Non-Partisan Judges ↑
Electoral Cycle Effects
Partisan Election Year ↓
Non-Partisan Election Year ↓ ↓
Uncontested Election Year ↓ ~ ↑
Retention Reform Effects
Move to Non-Partisan ↓
Move to Uncontested ~ ↑
Summary of results. The left-most column indicates the treatment, and the other column headers 
indicate the sample of judges upon which the effect is being measured. Arrows indicate a positive or 
negative effect on judge performance. A tilde (~) indicates no effect. See text for details.
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The evidence suggests that non-partisan elections select better judges than partisan elec-
tions. This is consistent with a selection model where a stronger signal on party affiliation
crowds out information on candidate quality, so candidates are lower quality on average. The
evidence also suggests that an expert, merit-based selection process selects better judges than
an election system. This is consistent with a selection model where better-informed experts
can choose more high quality officials than voters on average. In the realm of selecting public
officials, more information is not always better for the quality of the person chosen.
For incumbent judges, we find that stronger electoral incentives reduce performance in
election years, and that contested elections reduce performance more than uncontested elec-
tions. This is consistent with a simple model in which campaign effort takes time away from
judging. Moving from partisan to non-partisan elections reduces performance for incumbent
partisan-selected judges, which is consistent with the idea that partisan elections are less
competitive because voters are biased by political affiliations. Moving from non-partisan to
uncontested elections increases performance, consistent with the notion that non-partisan
contested elections are more demanding of a judge’s time than uncontested elections.
There is no within-judge effect of moving from partisan to uncontested elections. We
show that this occurs because the partisan-selected judges do not change their electoral
behavior – they continue to reduce performance during election years after the reform, even
though uncontested elections are not competitive. Merit-selected judges actually increase
some measures of performance during election years. These results highlight that these
electoral systems select for different types of individuals. These differences in abilities and
preferences result in measurable differences in their legal output.
A great deal of work remains. Even though we have a long panel, and arguably good
identification, the effects are often relatively small or barely significant. This fact may not
be all that surprising. If a single system had strong, consistent results, then we would have
expected the market to have moved in that direction quickly, consistent with Posner’s (1987)
view that legal institutions move in the direction of efficient exchange.
Yet, the fact that we do find a pattern of effects that are consistent with our simple model
helps explain why there is experimentation. The results are consistent with the hypothesis
that merit commissions select better judges, followed by non-partisan judges, and finally
partisan judges. Yet, judging is not a purely technical activity. There is a large literature in
political science showing that the political views of judges color their decisions, which may
explain why many jurisdictions prefer to allow the democratic process to be informed by
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the political views of judges.16 In this paper we provide some evidence on the performance
consequences of these choices, which will hopefully inform decision-making on this important
institutional question.
16See Epstein et al. (2013) for a discussion of federal judges, and copious citations to this large literature.
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A Model Appendix
This appendix enumerates the proofs for the major theoretical results from Section 3. Sub-
section A.1 formalizes the effects of bias and noise on the quality of selected judges. A.2
formalizes the role of bias and noise in campaign incentives for judge effort.
A.1 Effect of bias and noise on judge quality
Let φ,Φ respectively denote the standard normal’s probability density and cumulative dis-
tribution functions. The expected quality of judges selected by the governor, expression 3.2,














(qB − qA)φ (qB) dqB
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φ (qA) dqA (A.1)















4 ) < 0. (A.2)
This shows that a small amount of bias has a small negative effect on quality, that gets larger
with b. This proves Proposition 1.
Next we consider the expected quality with elections. In this case the expected payoff is
over qA and qB, with selection determined by the signals:
q¯E (b) =
∫ ∫
(qA + (qA − qB) Pr [sB > sA + b|qA, qB])φ (qA)φ (qB) dqAdqB.
Notice that (qA − qB) I (qA,qB, b) > (qA − qB) Pr [sB > sA + b|qA, qB] and hence we have im-
mediately that q¯G (b) > q¯E (b). Also since
dPr [sB > sA + b|qA, qB]
db
< 0
for all qA, qB, we have that expected ability of judges falls with b. This implies Proposition
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2.
A.2 Effect of campaign incentives on effort
We can write the signals observed by the voters as:
sj = mj + rjj,
= pij(xj + ej) + pijσjj,
where j follows a standard normal distribution. Let us compute:
Pr [mA + rAA + b ≥ mB + rBB] .
The inequality can be rewritten as:
mA + b+ eA − eB −mB ≥ rBB − rAA =
√
r2B + r2A,
where  is a standard normal distribution. Hence, we have:




















Taking the effort of the other judge as given, the first order condition for a judge defines an
optimal effort choice:










 ρA1+ρA (qA + eA) + b− ρB1+ρB (qB + eB)√
r2B + r2A
 . (A.4)
Observe that if piA = piB, both judges choose the same level of effort, and this has no
effect on the probability of winning – it is a negative sum game.
Assumption Effort costs are strongly convex given ρj, i ∈ {A,B} if for every x ∈ < the
solution to the following equation is unique:







 , i ∈ {A,B} .
Such functions exist because φ > 0 and φ′, φ′′ are bounded, and Cj (0) = C ′j (0) = 0, C ′′j > 0.
More generally, given any function C (e) satisfying C (0) = C ′ (0) = 0, C ′′ > 0, and precisions
ρj for j ∈ A,B, one can choose γj > 0 sufficiently large that this condition holds for
Cj (e) = γjC (e).
Proposition 4. If effort costs are strongly convex given ρj, i ∈ {A,B} then there exists a
Nash equilibrium in campaign effort. Moreover Judge A chooses more effort than Judge B
(eA > eB) if and only if the quality of information regarding Judge A is higher (piA > piB).








Let m = max {piAemaxA , piBemaxB } and define the function:
h : [−m,m]→ [−m,m]
by:
h (x) = ρA1 + ρA
eA (x)− ρB1 + ρB eB (x)
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where:




 ρA1+ρA qA + b− ρB1+ρB qB + x√
r2B + r2A
 .
Strong convexity ensures that ej (x) is a uniquely defined continuous function of x that
maximizes the payoff of judge j given the effort of the other judge. Hence h (x) is continuous,
and by Brower’s fixed point theorem we have the existence of x∗ such that h (x∗) = x∗, which



















This appendix includes some further notes on the data and the institutional reforms, as well
as further regression specifications.
B.1 Notes on Institutional Reforms
This section provides some notes on the institutional reforms. The key point is that there
were often coterminous reforms, such as the introduction of an intermediate appellate court.
To deal with this we ran all the regressions while leaving one state out. None of the re-
sults were substantially changed in these checks. Note that these coterminous reforms only
threaten identification in the analysis of retention-process reforms. When we look at the
electoral cycle and when we look at selection effects, we are holding court-specific incentives
constant.
Colorado instituted an intermediate appellate court in 1971, four years after the election
reform. Changing Colorado to a four year window does not change the results. Florida
moved from partisan to non-partisan elections in 1972, then moved from non-partisan to
merit-uncontested in 1977. Florida is not included in the selection process regressions. In
the retention-process regressions we treat these as separate reforms with five-year effect
windows. Removing Florida from the regressions does not change the results.
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At the same time that Illinois changed from partisan retention to uncontested retention
(November 1962), the state also increased judge term lengths from nine years to ten years.
However, the term-lengths change went into effect in January 1963, two years before the
election reform went into effect.
At the same time it moved from partisan to merit-uncontested, Indiana increased term
lengths from six years to ten years.
Kentucky instituted an intermediate appellate court at the same time that it moved from
partisan to non-partisan elections.
The Maryland governor began selecting new appointees by merit commission beginning
in 1971. When it moved from non-partisan retention to uncontested retention, the term
length was reduced from 15 years to 10 years.
Oklahoma instituted an intermediate appellate court at the same time it moved from
partisan to merit-uncontested.
In 1973, South Dakota increased its term length from six years to eight years, eight years
before the non-partisan to merit-uncontested reform.
Tennessee moved from partisan to merit-uncontested in 1972, then moved back to partisan
elections in 1975. It is not included in the analysis.
Utah instituted an intermediate appellate court in 1988, two years after the reform from
non-partisan to merit-uncontested.
B.2 Additional Regression Results
This appendix reports additional empirical results.
Table B1 reports summary statistics for the additional set of outcome variables. We have
dissents and concurrences reported separately. The outcome used in the main tables, discre-
tionary opinions written, includes concurrences, dissents, and opinions that are concurring
in part and dissenting in part.
We also report in the appendix an additional set of citations measures. These measures
were excluded from the main text for brevity and because they are relatively rare, as can be
seen in the summary statistics. Negative citations are coded as negative by Bloomberg staff
attorneys. Federal circuit cites includes citations from federal circuit courts. “Multiple-use”
cites means that an opinion is cites multiple times by a later court, which is similar to the
discussion cites measure used in the text. A case can be overruled by the state supreme
court at a later date, or it can be overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court on appeal. Finally, a
case can be superseded by statute – which means the state legislature passes a law to reverse
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Table B1: Summary Statistics on Judge-Year Performance Variables (Additional Outcomes)
Outcome Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dissents Written 3.755 5.694 0 129
Concurrences Written 1.816 3.448 0 60
Negative Cites Per Opinion 0.575 0.895 0 20.625
Federal Circuit Cites Per Opinion 0.649 3.624 0 153.11
Multiple-Use Cites Per Opinion 1.288 2.024 0 96
Proportion of Cases Overruled 0.052 0.194 0 5.52
Proportion of Cases Superseded by Statute 0.047 0.106 0 2.5
Total Negative Cites 11.629 15.932 0 246
Total Federal Circuit Cites 16.509 106.101 0 3503
Total Multiple-Use Cites 26.141 31.348 0 800
Total Cases Overruled 1.063 3.174 0 116
Total Cases Superseded by Statute 0.947 1.868 0 28
Notes. Observation is a judge-year, N=16,084. These statistics are constructed from each judge's yearly out-
put of cases.  “Per Opinion” measures are divided by the number of majority opinions written that year. See 
variable definitions in the accompanying text.
a court ruling.
Tables B7, B4, B11, and B16 report regression results from the same equations estimated
in the corresponding main tables but with the additional outcome measures. These results
generally line up with those in the main tables. Note that there are often strong effects on
negative cites, but that may be due to the initially low average for this measure (see Table
B1).
Tables B2 and B3 show the effects of the electoral cycle on individual performance
variables. As shown in Column 1, partisan elections are associated with reduced perfor-
mance/output. First, there is a decrease in the number of majority opinions and discre-
tionary opinions written. The point estimate indicates about an 8% decrease in the number
of words written, though the estimate is quite noisy. Average length of each opinion decreases
as well. Opinion quality is going down slightly (a decrease in positive cites), which means
that total cites are going down significantly for all of the measures.
Column 2 shows the effect for non-partisan elections. The number of discretionary opin-
ions and total words written decrease by 7% and 11% respectively, but as in the case of
a partisan election the estimate is quite noisy. There aren’t significant effects on average
opinion quality, except discussion cites. But the combined effect of slightly fewer opinions
and slightly lower quality results in statistically significant decreases in most of the total
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Table B2: Effect of Being Up For Election (Output and Effort)
Partisan Election Year
Outcome (1) (2) (3)
Majority Opinions Written -0.0583* -0.101 0.0654
(0.0296) (0.0658) (0.0425)
Words in Majority Opinions -0.0786* -0.119 0.0896+
(0.0350) (0.0739) (0.0470)
Cases Cited in Majority Opinions -0.0816* -0.108 0.100*
(0.0396) (0.0771) (0.0453)
Discretionary Opinions Written -0.0736** -0.0699* 0.061
(0.0285) (0.0354) (0.0383)
Words in Discretionary Opinions -0.208+ -0.154 0.362**
(0.123) (0.128) (0.126)
Cases Cited in Discretionary Opinions -0.1 -0.131** 0.0711
(0.0854) (0.0404) (0.0873)
Words Per Majority Opinion -0.0196+ -0.0166 0.0218+
(0.0108) (0.0130) (0.0128)
Cases Cited Per Majority Opinion -0.0211 -0.00571 0.0331*
(0.0168) (0.0204) (0.0163)
Words Per Discretionary Opinion -0.142 -0.0881 0.333**
(0.117) (0.138) (0.103)
Cases Cited Per Discretionary Opinion -0.0377 -0.0499 0.0531
(0.0678) (0.0608) (0.0667)
Treated States 23 17 19
Treated Judges 437 270 277





N= 16,084 judge-years. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
Each row is from a separate regression for the stated outcome variable. Treatment variable is a dummy 
equaling one for years judge is facing reelection. Regressions include a state-year fixed effect and judge 
fixed effect, estimated using Stat's reg2hdfe module.
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Table B3: Effect of Being Up For Election (Quality and Impact)
Partisan Election Year
Outcome (1) (2) (3)
Positive Cites Per Opinion -0.0390* -0.0222 -0.00167
(0.0183) (0.0231) (0.0186)
Distinguishing Cites Per Opinion -0.038 -0.0297 0.0252
(0.0246) (0.0275) (0.0354)
Discuss Cites Per Opinion -0.026 -0.0273+ 0.0109
(0.0186) (0.0166) (0.0153)
Quoted Cites Per Opinion -0.0273+ -0.0229 0.00125
(0.0151) (0.0150) (0.0204)
Out-of-State Cites Per Opinion -0.0213 0.00414 0.0231
(0.0177) (0.0254) (0.0232)
Total Positive Cites -0.106* -0.158+ 0.0661
(0.0416) (0.0882) (0.0451)
Total Distinguishing Cites -0.124* -0.188* 0.0839
(0.0552) (0.0907) (0.0692)
Total Discuss Cites -0.0888* -0.160* 0.0795+
(0.0444) (0.0715) (0.0427)
Total Quoted Cites -0.0930* -0.161* 0.0685
(0.0424) (0.0725) (0.0416)
Total Out-of-State Cites -0.0970* -0.104 0.0929*
(0.0448) (0.0782) (0.0431)
Treated States 23 17 19
Treated Judges 437 270 277





N= 16,084 judge-years. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
Each row is from a separate regression for the stated outcome variable. Treatment variable is a dummy 
equaling one for years judge is facing reelection. Regressions include a state-year fixed effect and judge 
fixed effect, estimated using Stat's reg2hdfe module.
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Table B4: Effect of Being Up For Election (Additional Outcomes)
Outcome (1) (2) (3)
Number of Concurrences Written -0.0282 -0.0227 -0.00666
(0.0320) (0.0294) (0.0348)
Number of Dissents Written -0.0563** -0.0621* 0.0616*
(0.0201) (0.0254) (0.0270)
Negative Cites Per Opinion -0.0244* -0.0229+ 0.018
(0.0124) (0.0120) (0.0188)
Federal Circuit Cites Per Opinion -0.0154* -0.0042 -0.00141
(0.00679) (0.00532) (0.00971)
Multiple-Use Cites Per Opinion -0.0132 -0.0199+ 0.00565
(0.0105) (0.0114) (0.0175)
Proportion of Cases Overruled -0.000786 0.00634 0.00553
(0.00566) (0.00889) (0.00973)
Proportion of Cases Superseded by Statute -0.00555 -0.000988 0.00865
(0.00355) (0.00352) (0.00636)
Total Negative Cites -0.115* -0.169** 0.1
(0.0505) (0.0654) (0.0680)
Total Federal Circuit Cites -0.101** -0.0664 0.0262
(0.0305) (0.0491) (0.0468)
Total Multiple-Use Cites -0.0819* -0.142** 0.0586
(0.0413) (0.0512) (0.0489)
Cases Overruled -0.0332 -0.0485 0.0504
(0.0329) (0.0385) (0.0583)








cites measures. Though the coefficients are imprecisely estimated, the point estimates are of
the same order of magnitude as in the case of a partisan election.
Column 3 shows the effect of uncontested elections. There aren’t any negative effects
from the electoral cycle in this system. There are actually some positive effects, with an
increase in total words written, majority opinion length, length of table of cases, and some
of the cites measures.
In Table B4, note that in partisan and non-partisan election years, there is a decrease in
the number of dissents, but no effect on concurrences. In uncontested elections, meanwhile,
there is a large positive election-year effect on dissents.
Tables B5 and B6 report the estimates from Equation 6.1 for the individual variables.
Column 1 estimates the average difference in performance between non-partisan judges and
partisan judges. Relative to the partisan judges, the non-partisan judges write shorter opin-
ions, but they are higher quality. Opinions written by non-partisan judges have more positive
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Table B5: Effect of Judicial Selection System on Judge Quality (Output and Effort)
Outcome (1) (2) (3)
Majority Opinions Written 0.0844 -0.148+ -0.111
(0.0546) (0.0804) (0.115)
Words in Majority Opinions -0.0525 -0.0566 0.00523
(0.0750) (0.0569) (0.147)
Cases Cited in Majority Opinions -0.0897 0.0186 0.0108
(0.124) (0.0581) (0.126)
Discretionary Opinions Written 0.368 -0.13 0.453*
(0.373) (0.147) (0.208)
Words in Discretionary Opinions 0.579 0.159 1.235
(0.766) (0.456) (0.817)
Cases Cited in Discretionary Opinions 0.891** 0.152 0.837
(0.265) (0.341) (0.536)
Words Per Majority Opinion -0.135* 0.0918 0.116
(0.0507) (0.0595) (0.0722)
Cases Cited Per Majority Opinion -0.167 0.166** 0.121
(0.117) (0.0571) (0.0856)
Words Per Discretionary Opinion 0.206 0.32 0.863
(0.445) (0.372) (0.676)
Cases Cited Per Discretionary Opinion 0.509** 0.296 0.447
(0.106) (0.245) (0.389)
Treated States 3 6 3
Treated State-Years 24 86 24
Treated Judges 14 54 16
Non-Partisan Judges 
Relative to Partisan 
Judges
Merit-Selected Judges 





N= 16,084 judge-years..Estimate of the average difference between judges selected under a new system, relative to to 
judges selected under the old system, limited to years in which there are at least two judges on the court selected from each 
system. Regressions include a state-year fixed effect, a full set of dummies for years of experience, and a full set of 
dummies for starting years. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01.
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Table B6: Effect of Judicial Selection System on Judge Quality (Quality and Impact)
Outcome (1) (2) (3)
Positive Cites Per Opinion 0.0692+ 0.0690+ 0.114
(0.0382) (0.0391) (0.0765)
Distinguishing Cites Per Opinion 0.108+ 0.0992+ 0.251+
(0.0582) (0.0518) (0.131)
Discuss Cites Per Opinion 0.0355 0.0702* 0.154*
(0.0652) (0.0290) (0.0593)
Quoted Cites Per Opinion -0.0751 0.0942* 0.239**
(0.0562) (0.0442) (0.0891)
Out-of-State Cites Per Opinion -0.0217 0.121** 0.194
(0.0674) (0.0341) (0.136)
Total Positive Cites 0.148** -0.0777 -0.00391
(0.0553) (0.0776) (0.156)
Total Distinguishing Cites 0.418** -0.0102 0.13
(0.131) (0.106) (0.217)
Total Discuss Cites 0.124 -0.0708 0.0372
(0.0966) (0.0648) (0.152)
Total Quoted Cites -0.0242 -0.0255 0.123
(0.0785) (0.0669) (0.176)
Total Out-of-State Cites 0.0324 0.0308 0.0847
(0.145) (0.0793) (0.232)
Treated States 3 6 3
Treated State-Years 24 86 24
Treated Judges 14 54 16
Non-Partisan Judges 
Relative to Partisan 
Judges
Merit-Selected Judges 





N= 16,084 judge-years..Estimate of the average difference between judges selected under a new system, relative to to 
judges selected under the old system, limited to years in which there are at least two judges on the court selected from each 
system. Regressions include a state-year fixed effect, a full set of dummies for years of experience, and a full set of 
dummies for starting years. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01.
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cites and more distinguishing than opinions written by partisan judges in the same court
and same year. The effect is larger and more significant when we consider the total cites.
Column 2 estimates the performance measure differential for merit-selected judges relative
to partisan-selected judges. While merit judges write fewer opinions than the partisan elected
judges, they are higher-quality on a range of measures. The merit judges have more caselaw
research, as seen in the Length of Table of Cases. They also have more citations on all of
our metrics – positive, distinguishing, discussed-in, quoted-in, and out-of-state.
In Column 3 we look at the difference between merit-selected judges and non-partisan-
selected judges. First, the merit-selected judges write more discretionary opinions than
the non-partisan-selected judges. In terms of opinion quality, merit-selected judges write
higher-quality opinions than non-partisan-selected judges for most of the citation measures.
For distinguishing cites, discussion cites, and quoted cites, the estimates are statistically
significant.
Table B8 reports an alternative specification for the selection-process results. Recall that
for the Table 6 estimates, we only included years where there were at least two judges from
each system working together on the court. Table B8 includes all years, so it includes years
where there is only one judge from one of the systems – so the effect is identified off that
judge’s difference from the rest of the court. The estimated coefficients are different in this
table, but the results all go in the same direction. Non-partisan judges are better than their
partisan colleagues. Merit judges are better than their election colleagues.
Tables B9 and B10 report retention-system reform effects on individual performance vari-
ables. Column 1 gives the incentive effect on sitting judges of moving from a partisan system
to a non-partisan system. We see small negative coefficients for number of majority opin-
ions, total words written, and total discussion cites. These are only marginally significant,
however.
Column 2 has the effect of moving from a partisan system to an uncontested system.
Here we see no effects on performance.
Finally we look at Column 3. In contrast with the other reforms, moving from non-
partisan to uncontested elections is associated with an increase in performance on a range
of measures. While the number of majority opinions doesn’t change, the number of discre-
tionary opinions does increase. Caselaw research also increases. There are large positive
effects on the quality of opinions written, as reflected in positive cites, distinguishing cites,
discuss cites, and quoted cites. The total cites measures are more noisy and less significant,
but still positive.
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Table B7: Effect of Judicial Selection System on Judge Quality (Additional Outcomes)
Outcome (1) (2) (3)
Number of Concurrences Written 0.22 -0.065 0.269+
(0.324) (0.0602) (0.141)
Number of Dissents Written 0.301+ -0.106 0.211
(0.162) (0.132) (0.247)
Negative Cites Per Opinion 0.0455** 0.0395** 0.133**
(0.0159) (0.0146) (0.0452)
Federal Circuit Cites Per Opinion 0.00357 0.0249+ 0.0677**
(0.0124) (0.0141) (0.0107)
Multiple-Use Cites Per Opinion -0.0439 0.0484* 0.202**
(0.0554) (0.0197) (0.0671)
Proportion of Cases Overruled 0.0171 0.00511 -0.00256
(0.0144) (0.00806) (0.00931)
Proportion of Cases Superseded by Statute 0.00881 0.00505 0.0365**
(0.00934) (0.00498) (0.0133)
Total Negative Cites 0.246** 0.0213 0.141
(0.0373) (0.0540) (0.110)
Total Federal Circuit Cites 0.0509 0.00275 0.224+
(0.0875) (0.0588) (0.124)
Total Multiple-Use Cites 0.000095 0.0148 0.162
(0.137) (0.0404) (0.181)
Cases Overruled 0.00862 -0.0263 -0.00949
(0.0542) (0.0493) (0.0616)
Cases Superseded by Statute 0.0473 0.0241 0.141
(0.0324) (0.0412) (0.0895)
Non-Partisan Judges 
Relative to Partisan 
Judges
Merit-Selected 
Judges Relative to 
Partisan Judges
Merit-Selected 
Judges Relative to 
Non-Partisan Judges
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Table B8: Effect of Judicial Selection System on Judge Quality (All Years)
Outcome (1) (2) (3)
Majority Opinions Written 0.149** -0.0925 -0.0976
(0.0451) (0.0894) (0.0783)
Discretionary Opinions Written 0.204 -0.173 0.119
(0.297) (0.119) (0.195)
Total Words Written 0.0873 -0.015 -0.0829
(0.0786) (0.0646) (0.141)
Length of Majority Opinion -0.0706+ 0.0899+ 0.05
(0.0390) (0.0484) (0.102)
Length of Table of Cases -0.143 0.124* 0.0534
(0.0925) (0.0575) (0.0903)
Positive Cites Per Opinion
-0.01 0.0362 0.125*
Distinguishing Cites Per Opinion (0.0570) (0.0379) (0.0602)
-0.00849 0.0668 0.123
Discuss Cites Per Opinion (0.0596) (0.0466) (0.0762)
0.022 0.0389 0.132*
Quoted Cites Per Opinion (0.0286) (0.0274) (0.0586)
-0.044 0.0478 0.171*





Total Distinguishing Cites (0.0998) (0.0800) (0.140)
0.168 0.0345 0.0392
Total Discuss Cites (0.144) (0.0967) (0.179)
0.176* -0.0454 0.0427
Total Quoted Cites (0.0825) (0.0761) (0.131)
0.0725 -0.0232 0.0906




Relative to Partisan 
Judges
Merit-Selected Judges 






Table B9: Effect of Retention Process (Output and Effort)
Outcome (1) (2) (3)
Majority Opinions Written -0.153+ 0.0602 -0.0899
(0.0852) (0.0590) (0.100)
Words in Majority Opinions -0.115+ 0.0274 -0.0363
(0.0587) (0.0418) (0.0713)
Cases Cited in Majority Opinions -0.155+ 0.033 0.0694
(0.0780) (0.0579) (0.0786)
Discretionary Opinions Written -0.101 0.0174 0.190*
(0.0738) (0.120) (0.0906)
Words in Discretionary Opinions 0.0974 -0.149 0.743
(0.299) (0.479) (0.459)
Cases Cited in Discretionary Opinions 0.116 -0.0221 0.43
(0.124) (0.278) (0.268)
Words Per Majority Opinion 0.0371 -0.0317 0.0516
(0.0832) (0.0376) (0.0682)
Cases Cited Per Majority Opinion -0.00619 -0.0272 0.155*
(0.0781) (0.0766) (0.0654)
Words Per Discretionary Opinion 0.219 -0.186 0.597
(0.279) (0.409) (0.461)
Cases Cited Per Discretionary Opinion 0.235* -0.0457 0.28
(0.0933) (0.202) (0.238)
Treated States 4 8 6
Treated Judges 25 65 35
Partisan Retention to 
Non-Partisan 
Retention







N= 16,084 judge-years.Estimate of the average treatment effect of changing the judge retention system on incumbent 
judges at the time of the reform. Regressions include a judge fixed effect, year fixed effect, and state trends. Standard 
errors clustered by state in parentheses. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01.
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Table B10: Effect of Retention Process (Quality and Impact)
Outcome (1) (2) (3)
Positive Cites Per Opinion 0.0492 -0.0173 0.111*
(0.0841) (0.0716) (0.0551)
Distinguishing Cites Per Opinion 0.0328 -0.0745 0.304**
(0.0505) (0.0559) (0.0949)
Discuss Cites Per Opinion 0.0144 -0.0315 0.0915+
(0.0718) (0.0500) (0.0478)
Quoted Cites Per Opinion -0.00402 -0.0355 0.102*
(0.0786) (0.0474) (0.0481)
Out-of-State Cites Per Opinion -0.00613 -0.013 0.0768
(0.0461) (0.0357) (0.0680)
Total Positive Cites -0.108 0.0574 0.0143
(0.0966) (0.0867) (0.126)
Total Distinguishing Cites -0.0996 -0.0713 0.308*
(0.0692) (0.0833) (0.134)
Total Discuss Cites -0.140+ 0.0497 -0.00665
(0.0791) (0.0876) (0.125)
Total Quoted Cites -0.149 0.0288 0.00288
(0.0955) (0.0719) (0.120)
Total Out-of-State Cites -0.157 0.0629 0.00356
(0.105) (0.0706) (0.121)
Treated States 4 8 6
Treated Judges 25 65 35
Partisan Retention to 
Non-Partisan Retention





N= 16,084 judge-years.Estimate of the average treatment effect of changing the judge retention system on incumbent 
judges at the time of the reform. Regressions include a judge fixed effect, year fixed effect, and state trends. Standard 
errors clustered by state in parentheses. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01.
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Table B11: Effect of Retention Process (Additional Outcomes)
Outcome (1) (2) (3)
Number of Concurrences Written -0.191** 0.00801 0.0557
(0.0624) (0.0567) (0.106)
Number of Dissents Written -0.0375 0.034 0.0386
(0.0731) (0.0772) (0.0617)
Negative Cites Per Opinion 0.0206 -0.0189 0.134**
(0.0137) (0.0300) (0.0474)
Federal Circuit Cites Per Opinion -0.0406** -0.00426 0.00738
(0.00522) (0.0113) (0.0221)
Multiple-Use Cites Per Opinion -0.0108 -0.0187 0.0694
(0.0294) (0.0235) (0.0501)
Proportion of Cases Overruled 0.0238* 0.00099 -0.00551
(0.0118) (0.00827) (0.00503)
Prop. Cases Superseded by Statute 0.00336 -0.00738* 0.0274**
(0.00398) (0.00365) (0.00710)
Total Negative Cites -0.00581 0.0377 0.307*
(0.0654) (0.0624) (0.124)
Total Federal Circuit Cites -0.168** 0.0341 -0.0255
(0.0465) (0.0575) (0.101)
Total Multiple-Use Cites -0.146+ 0.0569 0.0127
(0.0852) (0.0709) (0.103)
Cases Overruled 0.0992 0.0377 -0.136*
(0.0616) (0.0348) (0.0546)
Cases Superseded by Statute 0.0288 -0.0141 0.216**
(0.0395) (0.0255) (0.0715)
Partisan Retention to 
Non-Partisan Retention






In Table B11, note that the effect of the non-partisan to uncontested reform has inter-
esting effects. Under the nonpartisan-to-uncontested reform, judges are overruled less often
by later courts, but they are overruled more often by the legislature. There are also higher
negative cites per opinion. This may be a sign of greater judicial independence.
Tables B12 and B13 report the election-selection interaction effects on individual per-
formance variables. Column 1a gives the baseline effect of non-partisan elections on non-
partisan selected judges. Column 1a has negative effects, which are similar to the estimates
for non-partisan elections in Table 5. Column 1b shows the relative effect of non-partisan
elections on partisan judges. These are mostly zeros, with a likely spurious positive effect
on out-of-state cites.
Column 2a gives the baseline effect of uncontested elections on merit-selected judges. This
column is similar to column 3 from Table 5, which gave the average effect of uncontested
elections. As with that table, there are actually positive effects estimated for the election-
cycle effect in an uncontested system. When one only looks at the merit-selected judges, the
effect is stronger.
Column 2b gives the relative effect of uncontested elections on partisan-selected judges.
There are significant negative effects. The coefficients are larger in absolute value than the
coefficients from Column 2a, meaning that uncontested elections have a negative effect on
performance for partisan-selected judges. This means that partisan judges respond in the
opposite direction due to elections compared to merit-selected judges.
Finally Column 2c gives the relative effect of uncontested elections for non-partisan-
selected judges, relative to merit judges. There aren’t any significant differences here.
Notice that the point estimates on out of state citations for partisan judges are very large.
When facing a competitive non-partisan election there is a 36% increase in citations, but an
18% decrease in an uncontested election. The pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that
partisan judges are more sensitive to incentives. This provides some direct evidence that the
characteristics of the judges vary by the selection procedure.
Table B14 reports additional outcomes for the interacted study of incentives and selec-
tion. The estimates are similar to those in Table 8. Partisan-selected judges respond to
uncontested elections with a reduction in negative cites, circuit cites, and multiple-use cites.
B.3 Effect of Retention Process in Election Years
In this section we look at the retention reforms and the electoral cycle together. We look at































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































see whether the observed effect is due to changes in campaigning behavior.
This subsection describes the empirical strategy for looking at the election-year effects
of the retention process reforms. The regression approach combines the approach from
Subsection 6.1 on the electoral cycle with the approach from Subsection 6.2 on the retention
process reforms.
As before, we have the vector of election dummies Eist that equal one when judge i from
state s is up for election at year t, with a separate set of dummies for each retention system.
We have the vector of treatment indicators for the retention treatments, Rst, which go into
effect relative to the 10-year treatment window R¯st as described in Subsection 6.2.1. As in
Subsection 6.2, our regressions include year fixed effects, judge fixed effects, and state-specific
time trends.
The regressions include the full set of interactions EistR′st. Specifically, we estimate
yist = TIMEt + JUDGEi + STATEs × t+ R¯′stρ¯+ EistR′stρ+ ist (B.1)
where again we cluster standard errors by state. The components of ρ include the effects
of the reform in non-election years (E = 0) as well as the effects in election years (E = 1).
Because the interactions are included, this is relative to the election-year average before the
reform.
An additional specification is reported in Appendix Table B18. In that specification, the
election-year effect is measured relative to a baseline for all years after the reform (rather
than looking at non-election years and election years separately).
The results on the effect of the retention process reform on election and non-election
years are reported in Table 7. The “a” columns report the effect in non-election years. The
“b” columns report the effect in election years. We report the results for partisan to non-
partisan, and non-partisan to uncontested. The results from partisan to uncontested (they
are all zeros) are in Appendix Table B17.
Columns 1a and 1b look at the election/non-election effects for the partisan to non-
partisan reform. These results bolster what was found in Subsection 6.2. We see significant
negative effects when we look at election years specifically. There is a decrease in majority
opinions written, total positive cites, total discuss cites, and total quote cites.
Columns 2a and 2b show the effect of moving from nonpartisan-to-uncontested reform.
The baseline effect is comparable to the estimate from Table 6, with clear improvements
in opinion quality. Moreover, as seen in Column 2b, this effect is even stronger in election
years.
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Table B15: Effect of Retention Process in Election Years
Election Years Election Years
Outcome (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
Majority Opinions Written -0.137 -0.252** -0.0972 -0.0771
(0.0839) (0.0882) (0.0968) (0.0863)
Discretionary Opinions Written -0.0905 -0.0898 0.136+ 0.183*
(0.0639) (0.0644) (0.0762) (0.0754)
Total Words Written -0.0965+ -0.236 -0.022 0.0609
(0.0536) (0.142) (0.0694) (0.0687)
Length of Majority Opinion 0.0395 0.0187 0.047 0.0757
(0.0795) (0.116) (0.0678) (0.0805)
Length of Table of Cases -0.0165 0.0127 0.135* 0.201**
(0.0613) (0.144) (0.0604) (0.0736)
Positive Cites Per Opinion 0.0377 0.0596 0.0919+ 0.177*
(0.0739) (0.0754) (0.0461) (0.0672)
Distinguishing Cites Per Opinion 0.0149 0.0851 0.221** 0.291**
(0.0347) (0.0893) (0.0707) (0.0740)
Discuss Cites Per Opinion 0.00857 0.0184 0.0678+ 0.119**
(0.0530) (0.0686) (0.0382) (0.0419)
Quoted Cites Per Opinion -0.00617 -0.000161 0.0712+ 0.155**
(0.0600) (0.0768) (0.0392) (0.0543)
Out-of-State Cites Per Opinion -0.0147 0.0548 0.0513 0.0875
(0.0361) (0.0511) (0.0503) (0.0572)
Total Positive Cites -0.0914 -0.183* -0.00721 0.125
(0.101) (0.0858) (0.127) (0.103)
Total Distinguishing Cites -0.0882 -0.144 0.274* 0.403**
(0.0624) (0.182) (0.129) (0.119)
Total Discuss Cites -0.118 -0.252** -0.0272 0.0699
(0.0812) (0.0870) (0.124) (0.0972)
Total Quoted Cites -0.125 -0.290* -0.0251 0.12
(0.104) (0.124) (0.116) (0.0995)
Total Out-of-State Cites -0.139 -0.127 -0.0156 0.0527
(0.106) (0.114) (0.111) (0.114)
Treated States 4 6
Treated Judges 25 35
Partisan Retention to Non-Partisan 
Retention






N= 16,084 judge-years..Each row is a separate regression. The “a” columns give the baseline effect of changing the judge 
retention system on incumbent judges at the time of the reform, while the “b” columns give the additional effect during 
judge election years. Regressions include a judge fixed effect, year fixed effect, and state trends. Standard errors clustered 
by state in parentheses. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01.
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Table B16: Effect of Retention Process in Election Years (Additional Outcomes)
Election Years Election Years
Outcome (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
Number of Concurrences Written -0.184** -0.25 0.0619 0.0219
(0.0541) (0.174) (0.0998) (0.151)
Number of Dissents Written -0.0427 -0.00385 0.0388 0.0925+
(0.0781) (0.0564) (0.0622) (0.0544)
Negative Cites Per Opinion 0.0244+ 0.00355 0.133** 0.151**
(0.0130) (0.0389) (0.0490) (0.0403)
Federal Circuit Cites Per Opinion -0.0405** -0.0372 0.0106 -0.0234
(0.00662) (0.0254) (0.0209) (0.0324)
Multiple-Use Cites Per Opinion -0.016 0.0306 0.0645 0.0909+
(0.0291) (0.0458) (0.0502) (0.0527)
Proportion of Cases Overruled 0.0191* 0.0594 -0.00372 -0.0134
(0.00837) (0.0535) (0.00589) (0.00986)
Prop. Cases Superseded by Statute 0.00463 -0.00642 0.0257** 0.0387**
(0.00449) (0.00577) (0.00776) (0.00802)
Total Negative Cites 0.0127 -0.147 0.282* 0.338*
(0.0658) (0.131) (0.134) (0.135)
Total Federal Circuit Cites -0.151** -0.309* -0.0176 -0.177
(0.0490) (0.121) (0.0971) (0.158)
Total Multiple-Use Cites -0.129 -0.295* -0.0215 0.0576
(0.0852) (0.117) (0.109) (0.110)
Cases Overruled 0.0976+ 0.0904 -0.147* -0.123
(0.0568) (0.141) (0.0620) (0.0841)
Cases Superseded by Statute 0.0459 -0.125** 0.197** 0.248+
(0.0472) (0.0431) (0.0732) (0.129)
Partisan Retention to Non-Partisan 
Retention







The non-partisan-to-uncontested results show that there is both a durable effect across
the whole term, as well as an especially large effect from relieving electoral campaigning
demands. Overall, these results substantiate that the effects of these reforms are due in part
to the weakening of electoral demands.
Table B17 shows the estimates for the partisan-to-uncontested reform by election year,
which were left out of Table 7. These are almost all zeros – there is no within-judge electoral
effect of this reform.
Table B18 extends the analysis from Table 7 but looks at the relative effect of election
years to a baseline after the reform – rather than looking at the effects on non-election
years and election years separately. In this specification, we lose statistical significance in
the partisan-to-nonpartisan reform In the partisan to uncontested reform, we see a couple
of more positive effects of the reform in election years. In the nonpartisan-to-uncontested
meanwhile, the coefficients are positive in both columns, meaning that there is a statistically
significant additional positive effect during election years.
The partisan-to-non-partisan reform shows the stronger electoral demands from non-
partisan elections. Relative to the case before the reform (partisan elections), the election
years in non-partisan elections are more demanding and cause a larger reduction in per-
formance. This is consistent with those elections being more competitive. Particularly
noteworthy is the 25% decline in writing majority opinions in election years. This is consis-
tent with anecdotal evidence that in election years other judges on the court help reduce the
load on judges up for re-election. It seems that this pro-social behavior is more evident on
non-partisan benches.
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